The Constitution Viewed from Without

The drive for constitutional reform in the 1780’s was largely motivated by the perception that until the Federal government was strengthened the United States would not be able to meet its foreign and security policy challenges. Once Prof. Kochin puts the foreign and security policy difficulties of the 1780’s on the table, he will address two questions: First, why does *The Federalist* argue for the foreign and security policy need for the Union when nobody who opposes the 1787 Constitution argues against the “perpetual Union” created by the Articles? Second, what is the pressing “crisis” in foreign and security matters that in Publius’s view should persuade the remaining states to ratify the Constitution hastily?

Michael S. Kochin is Prof. Extr. of Political Science at Tel Aviv University and Visiting Fellow (2014-2015) at the Henry Salvatori Center for the Study of Individual Freedom at Claremont McKenna College; he has also held visiting appointments at Toronto, Princeton, and Yale. He is currently working on a book on early American foreign and security policy from the struggle for independence through the 1826 Congress of Panama, *An Independent Empire: Politics and Policy in Early American Diplomacy*.

Seating is limited. Lunch and refreshments will be served.

Please R.S.V.P. to ehuerta@cmc.edu by Wednesday February 25, (12:00 Noon)