Building State Communities: Identity and Federated Resource Sharing

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Abstract: In this paper, we argue that American federalism structures the impact and development of civic culture by emphasizing layered political identities that, in turn, shape Americans' sense of community. While much of the scholarly focus has been on national or regional identity (e.g. Huddy and Khatib 2007, Theiss-Morse 2009, Cooper and Knotts 2017), we focus on Americans' attachment to their state of residence. State identity was thought to hold primacy over any ties to the nation at the American Founding (Pears 2022, Feeley and Rubin 2011), but researchers question its relevance to contemporary American politics. Some see state identity as increasingly irrelevant as political behavior and partisanship has nationalized (Hopkins 2018, Wong 2010), while others demonstrate that it continues to shape trust in government and participation (Pears and Sydnor 2022a, 2022b, Schildkraut, n.d., Young 2015). To investigate the relationship between state identity and a sense of state-level community, we draw on data from a 50-state survey about people's attitudes during the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as online survey experiments in which participants play three different adapted dictator's games (see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986). In each study, individuals with a greater sense of state identity were also more generous towards their fellow state residents, whether in the sharing of tangible financial resources or their understanding of how the collective had reacted to the pandemic. The continued salience of state identity—and its impact on political behavior—has important implications for the sustenance of federalism in America.

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In the wake of Hurricane Helene's destructive path through western North Carolina, social media was rife with videos of people using all-terrain vehicles, horses, and other alternative forms of transportation to carry supplies to isolated communities in the Appalachian Mountains. These viral videos capture the foundational centrality of social capital and civil society to contemporary democracy. To function well, democracy requires that its citizens trust one another, are connected to one, and are willing to assist one another, even when they disagree. As Dewey wrote, "democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of community life itself." (1927, 148). Democratic institutions are bolstered by civic communities that mirror their structure, and social capitol is reinforced by federated institutional design that allows republican policymaking to reflect real-world social connections.

In this paper, we argue that American federalism structures the impact and development of civic culture by emphasizing layered political identities that, in turn, shape Americans' sense of community. A real sense of state-level community bolsters and reinforces the role that states play in national politics. While much of the scholarly focus has been on national or regional identity (e.g. Huddy and Khatib 2007, Theiss-Morse 2009, Cooper and Knotts 2017), we focus on Americans' attachment to their state of residence. State identity was thought to hold primacy over any ties to the nation at the American Founding (Pears 2022, Feeley and Rubin 2011), but researchers have questioned its relevance to contemporary American politics. Some see state identity as increasingly irrelevant in as political behavior and partisanship has nationalized (Hopkins 2018, Wong 2010), while others demonstrate that it continues to shape trust in government and participation (Pears and Sydnor 2022a, 2022b, Schildkraut, n.d., Young 2015). The continued salience of state identity—and its impact on political behavior—has important implications for the sustenance of federalism in America.

To investigate the relationship between state identity and a sense of state-level community, we draw on data from a 50-state survey about people's attitudes during the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as three online survey experiments in which participants play an adapted dictator's game (see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986). In the first game, players allocate money between themselves and a second participant, randomly assigned to be either from the player's state or a different one. In the second and third games, players allocate money between the National Park Foundation and a state park foundation. In all instances, individuals with a greater sense of state identity were also more generous towards their fellow state residents, whether in the sharing of tangible financial resources or their understanding of how the collective had reacted to the pandemic. Our findings suggest that even in an era of nationalization of American politics, states are an important locus of identity that build social capital and community distinct from the national government.

The Democratic Importance of Social Capital

Empirical and normative scholars alike both emphasize the importance of community to the success of democracy and look to better understand the criteria for and impact of inclusion and exclusion in particular communities. "To have democracy there has to be a we," political theorist Wendy Brown explains in an interview with Astra Taylor. "You have to know who *we the people* are. It can't just be a kind of vague universal thing…democracy has to have bounds. It has to have a constitutive we" (Taylor 2019, 81-82). In a federalist system like that of the United States, the layering of government at the local, state and national level both structures and mirrors the development of the "constitutive we." Karmis and Norman characterize this pattern as "federal identity," or "a dual or plural identity that both generates and reflects the duality or plurality of political levels characteristic of federal systems" (2005, 9). One explanation for the

adoption of federalism at the Founding is that it facilitated the development of a national government amid the reality of multiple colonial identities (Pears 2022, Feeley and Rubin 2011). Strong state-level communities reinforced states' ability to defend citizen liberty by pushing back against federal encroachment (Levy 2007). American federalism is predicated, at least in part, on the existence of strong communities that coincide with existing state borders.

However, as the United States has grown, Americans' commitment to a federated identity structure appears to have waned. Research by Hopkins (2018) and Wong (2010) finds that states do not hold the same centrality to Americans' political identities that their national and local affiliations do. However, Schildkraut (2024) finds that people do see their state as an important part of their identity and many mention politics or politically adjacent reasons for their state's importance to them. From an institutional perspective, Haworth (2009) argues that American government today is a de facto unitary system, breaking down the possibility of social cohesion at lower levels of government. This apparent breakdown of the identity-based communities intended to bolster federalism raises questions about the strength of civic culture and democracy within our federalist system.

As Putnam defines it, "social capital refers to connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them…'social capital' calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations" (2000, 19). In *Bowling Alone*, he argues that social capital is directly related to positive political and governmental outcomes: states with higher social capital have higher tax compliance and higher donations to public broadcasting, among others (Putnam 2000). Similarly, Rice and Sumberg's (1997) index of state-level civic culture correlates with policy outcomes such that states that are more civic enact more liberal and innovative policies.

Social capital facilitates representative government by encouraging individuals to put the collective before their own interests (Tocqueville 2003, Mill 1861) and augments individual voices (Gutmann 1998).

Putting all of this research together, then, we argue that state identity is important for our understanding of federalism in the United States in part because it facilitates the development of civic community and social capital necessary for shared governance across national, state, and local units. We expect that those higher in state identity will express a greater sense of community with those who also live in their state (H1). What's more, political psychology research tells us identity groups are more cooperative and generous to individuals in their own group (Theiss-Morse 2009). Given this pattern, we expect this sense of community to manifest in a willingness to share financial resources with others from their state relative to those from other states (H2). We test these hypotheses first through observational data collected across all 50 states, and then through three survey experiments.

The COVID States Project Survey

Methods

To test our first hypothesis, we use data collected as part of the COVID States Project (now the Civic Health and Institutions Project, or CHIP), a multi-university collaboration designed to "identify links between social behaviors and [COVID-19] virus transmission, as well as the impact of messaging and regulation on individual and community outcomes" (COVID States Project 2023). Questions about state identity were included in the 24th wave of the study, conducted between August 8 and September 13, 2022, by PureSpectrum, an online panel management platform. This wave surveyed 25,825 participants who were recruited from all 50

states and Washington, D.C. using flexible state-level demographic quotas for gender, age, race, and ethnicity. The survey also oversampled African American, Asian, and Hispanic respondents using additional sample augments. Table 1 displays the demographic characteristics of our sample relative to the national population.

[Table 1 here]

To capture the extent to which individuals identified with specific states, we asked eight questions—four about participants' feelings towards their current state of residence and four about the state they had lived in the longest. These measures resemble Huddy and Khatib's (2007) four-item index of national identity but with relevant state demonyms substituted for the term "American" in each question. Individuals placed themselves on a five-point scale from zero—the statement did not apply to them at all--to four—it was extremely important or relevant to them.[1] The items asked: How important is being [Californian, Texan, etc.] to you? To what extent do you see yourself as a typical [Californian, Texan, etc.]? How well does the term [Californian, Texan, etc.] describe you? And when talking about [Californians, Texans, etc.], how often do you say "we" instead of "they?" Responses to each of the four items were combined in an additive index and standardized to run from zero (lowest state identity) to one (highest state identity). Average current-state identity across all respondents fell at the midpoint of the scale (0.48, SD=0.30) with a relatively normal distribution. Participants' average identification with the state in which they'd lived longest was substantially lower (M=0.08, SD=0.22).

[1] This has also been adapted to measure other forms of identity, including partisan, black, evangelical, secular and Tea Party identities—see Huddy, Mason and Aaroe (2015), Mason (2016).

Participants were also asked several questions about how they perceived government and community responses to COVID-19. First, they were asked about the extent to which the pandemic increased or decreased their sense of community with Americans, residents of the state they currently lived in, and people in their neighborhood. They were asked about the extent to which citizens of their state eased or worsened the effects of COVID-19 in their area, and also about how proud they were of their state's residents' response to the pandemic.

Findings

Hypothesis 1 argues that individuals with stronger state identity will feel a greater sense of community with other people from their state. We ask this directly in the COVID States survey, and can compare the effects of state identity on the sense of community with other state residents relative to community with other Americans or with local neighbors. Using a series of OLS regressions (see Appendix A) that control for a range of demographic characteristics, we find that state identity is positively correlated with a sense of community—regardless of who makes up the community group. Figure 1 displays this relationship graphically. People with a sense of state identity stronger than the midpoint were consistently likely to say that their sense of community with other Americans, people in their state, and people in their neighborhood increased as a result of the pandemic. However, the magnitude of this effect is greatest for their assessment of the relationship with others from their own state. While, on average, people at the lowest level of state identity saw their sense of community with other state residents as not changing much or somewhat declining because of the pandemic, those at the highest levels of state identity were over a full point (1.2) more positive about their state-level community. In contrast, the difference in the sense of community with other Americans between the highest and

lowest levels of state identity was about 0.6 on the 1 to 5 scale, and the difference in their sense of community with neighborhood residents was about 0.7.

[Figure 1 about here]

Looking at our other measures of state-level community—a sense of pride in fellow state residents' response to the pandemic and perceptions of whether state residents eased or worsened the effects of the pandemic—we find a similar effect of state identity. Those lowest in state identity are a full 1.3 points less proud of fellow residents' handling of the pandemic than those highest in state identity. They are also almost a full point (0.9) less positive about the impact of their fellow residents on the experience of the pandemic, putting their average assessment below the midpoint (a sense that other state residents worsened the effects of the pandemic), while those who feel strongly attached to their state feel as if their neighbors somewhat eased the effects of COVID-19.

[Figure 2 here]

The Dictator's Games

While the survey helps us understand the relationship between individuals' state identity and their sense of community with other state residents, it is limited to observational data that focuses on a specific form of community—participants' experience of the COVID-19 pandemic. It also does not allow for the testing of Hypothesis 2. To explore how state identity impacts individuals' resource allocation, we conducted three online survey experiments.[2] In all three experiments, participants were recruited from Prolific; Table 2 provides details about the

[2] The first experiment was registered on OSF: OSF pre-registration link here.

procedures for each study and the demographic makeup of the samples. Participants who had participated in one of the experiments were ineligible to participate in the others.

[Table 2 here]

There are a few things to highlight about each experiment. First, the Individual-Level Dictator's Game (Experiment 1) involved real payouts from the game in the form of bonuses. To make the paying of bonuses more manageable while avoiding any deception in the experiment, we recruited participants from only four U.S. states: Minnesota, Michigan, Iowa and Wisconsin.

Why these four states? In previous research, we find that state identity varies by state (Sydnor et al 2024); residents in some states, like Minnesota, Alaska, and Texas, have on average relatively high identification with their state while others average much lower identity (North and South Dakota, for example). In addition to their geographic proximity, Minnesota, Michigan, Iowa and Wisconsin all have relatively high average identity. This makes us more confident that any differences we see in sharing behavior within the experiment described below is the result of individual differences, and not the state the participant is from. That being said, we do conduct some exploratory analyses below to assess whether there are differences in resource-sharing behavior from state to state.

Second, the treatments in each experiment varied slightly. Dictator Games, in which one person decides how to distribute money between two people and the second person must unconditionally accept the distribution, are commonly used to examine prosocial and altruistic behavior (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986, Bolton & Ockenfels 2000). A meta-analysis of studies using dictator games demonstrates that most people will allocate some portion of the money to their partners across a wide range of initial allocation amounts and both hypothetical and real allocation scenarios (Engel 2011, Ben-Ner, Kramer and Levy 2008). There is some

debate over whether the use of real versus hypothetical incentives affects behavior in the game, with some scholars finding that real payouts lead participants to be less generous and but more cognitively engaged (Sefton 1992, Rydval and Ortmann 2004) while others (Ben-Ner, Kramer and Levy 2008) find there to be little difference in the average participant's choices when dealing with hypothetical and real incentives. Given concerns about attention in online samples, in the first experiment we erred on the side of greater cognitive engagement, offering real incentives in the form of additional bonus payouts—one based on how the individual played the game and one based on their partner's decision. While neither person knew their partner's choice, it's possible that the reciprocity inherent in the game affected their decision (see Burks et al 2003 and Ben-Ner, et al 2004 for discussions of how this works in asynchronous decision-making).

We randomly assigned participants to either play the game with a partner from their state or from another state. On average, across all experimental conditions, participants in the Individual-Level Dictator's Game chose to allocate 41 cents to their partner (sd = 0.26), although their choices ran the gamut from sharing nothing to the full $1 (median: 50 cents).[3]

In the second and third experiments, we used hypothetical games where individuals' decisions in the game were not tied to any sort of bonus payment. Instead, they received a flat amount regardless of how they played the game. Unlike the first experiment, in which the money

[3] Before participants reported their final decision on how to allocate the bonus payments, they were asked two questions designed to check their understanding of the rules of the game, which we also use as a form of attention check. They were first asked "if you choose for the other individual to receive $0.00, what will happen" (correct answer: they would receive a bonus of $1.00) and then how much they would receive if they allocated $0.75 to their partner ($0.25). It is entirely possible that participants could be paying close attention to the study and get these questions wrong because of mathematical errors, but it seems plausible that they get them wrong because they are not paying close attention to the study. Overall, the vast majority (81 percent) of participants got both questions correct, but 10 percent got one question wrong and 9 percent got them both wrong. We don't drop participants from the study for getting these questions wrong, but we do conduct a second set of analyses by category—participants who go both questions wrong, one question wrong, or both questions correct. These results are available from the authors upon request.

was allocated between the participant and a human partner, these experiments asked participants to choose how much to give to an organization—either the National Park Foundation or a state-level park foundation. Experiment 2, the Organization-Level Dictator's Game, the park foundations were pitted against one another, as participants were asked to allocate $10 between the National Park Foundation and either their state park foundation or another state's park foundation. Overall, participants allocated more to the National Park Foundation ($5.91) than to the state park foundations ($4.09). In the Organization-Level Donation Game (Experiment 3), participants were again given a hypothetical $10 and they could choose to keep the money or donate a proportion of it to a randomly assigned park foundation (National, their own state, or another state). On average, they donated $4.33. We also asked participants if they would make their donation anonymous or be willing to attach their name to it; the majority (79%) said that they would keep the donation anonymous.

In all three experiments, prior to playing the respective economic games, participants were asked the standard state identity battery described above (Pears and Sydnor 2022a), and the items were added together and standardized to run from zero (no identification with the state) to one (high identification with the state). The average participant's state identity in each experiment is shown in Table 3 and the distribution across each full sample is presented in the appendix (Figure A.1).

Findings

All three experiments provide different perspectives on hypothesis 2, which argues that individuals will be willing to share more resources with people or organizations who belong to the same state "group" that they do. To test this hypothesis, we use a series of two-sample t-tests

and one-way ANOVAs, comparing the average bonus allocated to participants' partners or to park organizations when they were from the same state relative to when they were from a different state or emphasized the nation. Figure 3 displays the differences in allocation across all three experiments. In the Individual-Level Dictator's Game, participants allocate, on average, three cents more to their partner when they're told their partner is from their state, a difference that is statistically significant at 0.05 (one-tailed $p = 0.03$, two-tailed $p = 0.05$). While this difference is not substantively very large, it nonetheless offers support for our hypothesis.

When we move to the organization level games and consider money allocated to the participant's state park foundation relative to both the National Park Foundation (NPF) and state park foundations for other states, we see that people equate their own state relative to the nation, but do not do the same for other states. In the organization-level dictator's game, participants split the funds relatively equally when they're randomly assigned to choose between the NPF ($4.70) and their own state's park foundation ($5.30). But when they are allocating between the NPF and another state's parks, they are far more generous to the National Park Foundation ($7.12) relative to the state organization ($2.86). The difference between treatment groups is statistically significant at 0.01 ($t=13.9$). Similarly, in the Organization-Level Donation Game, participants allocate statistically significantly different amounts to the organization to which they are assigned, according to a one-way ANOVA ($F(2, 790) = 10.89$, $p<0.01$). While participants allocate around the same amount to their own state's park foundation ($4.78) and the NPF ($4.69), they allocate more than a full dollar less to the park foundation from another state ($3.51). Bonferroni estimates indicate that the difference between other state park foundations and the NPF or own-state foundation are statistically significant, but that there is no statistical difference between donations to the NPF and participants' own state foundations.

[Figure 3 here]

Another way to think about this relationship is to consider how state identity impacts the difference in allocation of bonus payments. In the Individual-Level Dictator Game, this relationship can be represented in a basic OLS regression of state identity,[4] the partner-state treatment, and the interaction between the two on how much participants allocated in the dictator's game. These results displayed graphically in panel 1 of Figure 4. As state identity increases, the change in the average amount participants offer their out-of-state partners is relatively minimal—only a cent separates those who are not attached to their state at all and those who have the highest level of state identity. But when participants are sharing with a partner from their home state, those at the highest end of the scale are offering almost 30 cents more that those at the lower end and about 12 cents more than equally high identifiers who matched with someone from a different state.

Looking at the Organization-Level games in Figure 4, panels 2 and 3, we also see an impact of the interaction between state identity and funding recipient on giving behavior. When participants are forced to choose between the National Park Foundation and the state park foundation in the Dictator's Game, a higher state identity leads them to allocate more of their hypothetical dollars to their state park foundation relative to the national one (almost two dollars more that the lowest identifiers), but it has little impact on the amount they donate to other state park foundations relative to the National Park Foundation. In the Donation Game, donations to both one's own state park foundation and other states' foundations increase as state identity increases, but as one would expect, there's little effect of state identity on giving to the National

[4] For this analysis, participants' ability to correctly complete our initial directions that check for their understanding of the game affects the statistical significance of the outcome. Here, we present the results only for participants who correctly answered both "attention check" math problems included in the directions to the game. The results for the full sample are available in the Appendix.

Park Foundation. These findings offer additional support for our hypothesis that, when made important to residents, state identity can produce differential sharing of resources across groups.

Finally, we offer some exploratory findings about differences across states, based on the Individual-Level Dictator's Game. It is important to note these are exploratory because of concerns around statistical power; our a priori power analysis suggested we would need a sample size of 235 per treatment group in order to detect differences (effect size = 0.333, alpha = 0.05). If we subset the data by state of residence and then by the partner-state treatment, only the number of participants from Michigan approaches the necessary sample size (same state = 216 participants, different state = 204 participants). Each of the other states has between 93 (Iowa) and 230 (Wisconsin) total participants across both conditions. Thus, it is likely no surprise that the only state for which we see differences in bonus allocation across the partner-state treatments is Michigan. The Michiganders partnered with fellow Michigan residents offered, on average, 46 cents to their partner, while those partnered with someone from another state offered only 40 cents (two-tailed $p = 0.02$). As we'll discuss below, we hope future research can disentangle whether there are truly state-level effects here or if this is simply a story about the importance of statistical power in detecting effects.

Discussion

Across three survey experiments and one large national survey, we consistently find that people perceive others from their state as members of a shared community, especially when they feel a strong identification with their state. This leads them not only to hold positive attitudes towards fellow state residents, but also to differentially share financial resources with both other people from their state and organizations that benefit their state relative to those from outside. In an era of nationalization, where national government, policies, and attitudes are paramount, we

find that people are willing to support their state-level organizations at roughly the same amount as national organizations. When the founders designed American federalism, they did so with the existence of strong state identities in mind. Citizens who viewed themselves as Virginians first and Americans second, if at all, created both challenges and opportunities in the Constitutional Convention. Few if any Americans today hold state identities that are stronger than their national identities. But the continued existence of some state-level identity that bolsters social capital and structures how individuals view one another and participate in their communities, is important.

On the one hand, if federalism is predicated on dual national and state-level identities acting as constraints on people's political behavior, our findings offer hope that state identity is not completely subsumed into national interests. On the other hand, residents' ability to discriminate between in- and out-of-state partners in these small-payout games could be magnified by the federated system. While the comity clause of the Constitution guarantees that the state cannot give special privileges to its own residents in the context of fundamental rights, they can offer differentiated resources in other ways, a state-level manifestation of the outcomes of our games. Our findings suggest that research in state-level policymaking, and the increasingly adversarial relationship between states and the federal government should account for and pay particular attention to the continued existence of state-level in-group preferences.

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Table 1: Participant Demographics, COVID States Project Survey Wave 24, Compared to National Population

	COVID States Survey	National Population
Median Income	$47,499	$62,843
Median Age	47	38
Education		
<H.S. diploma	3%	12%
H.S. grad/some college	47%	56%
College grad +	50%	32%
Race/Ethnicity		
White	74%	76%
Black	13%	13%
Hispanic	8%	18%
Sex		
Female	62%	51%
Non-binary	1%	
Partisanship		
Democrat	42%	30%
Republican	37%	25%
Independent	22%	44%
Ideology		
Liberal	32%	25%
Moderate	36%	36%
Conservative	31%	35%
N		--

Note: Participants were able to check more than one race. Sample partisanship includes leaners as partisans, not independents. National data are from U.S. Census estimates from 2020, except for party ID (Gallup Inc. 2023)

Table 2: Details of Experimental Studies

	Experiment 1: Individual-Level Dictator's Game	Experiment 2: Organization-Level Dictator's Game	Experiment 3: Organization-Level Donation Game
Dates Administered	August 22, 2024	March 31, 2025	
Payout	Real	Hypothetical	Hypothetical
Amount Paid	$1 + bonus payment based on game results	$1.20	$1.20
N	953	804	801
Experimental Manipulation	Share $1 with individual from state of residence or other state	Split $10 between National Park Foundation and your state's Park Foundation *OR* other state's Park Foundation	Keep $10 or donate a proportion to randomly assigned park foundation (National, your state, other state)
Geographic Coverage	Minnesota, Michigan, Iowa & Wisconsin	National	National
Demographics			
Gender: Female	54%	51%	51%
White	80%	77%	75%
Median Age	40	46	47

Table 3: Average State Identity Across Experimental Studies

	Average State Identity
Experiment 1: Individual-Level Dictator's Game	0.51 (0.258)
Experiment 2: Organization-Level Dictator's Game	0.52 (0.284)
Experiment 3: Organization-Level Donation Game	0.52 (0.291)

Note: State Identity is measured on a standardized scale that runs from 0 (not at all attached to the state) to 1 (extremely connected). Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Figure 1: Identity Shapes Perceptions of the Pandemic's Effect on Community



Note: Figures represent linear predictions from three separate OLS regressions of identity on sense of community, controlling for a range of demographics. Sense of community is measured on a 5 point scale with 1 indicating a strong decrease in a sense of community with the relevant group, and 5 indicating a strong increase in the sense of community. A score of 3 indicated a neutral midpoint.

Figure 2: Identity Shapes Assessment of the Impact of State Residents on Pandemic Experience & on Pride in State Residents' Handling of the Pandemic



Note: Figures represent linear predictions from three separate OLS regressions of identity on 1) perceptions of whether other residents of one's state made the pandemic experience better or worse and 2) pride in fellow state residents' handling of the pandemic, controlling for a range of demographics. Impact on pandemic experience is measured on a 5-point scale with 1 indicating that citizens of the state strongly worsened the experience of the pandemic in the state, and 5 indicating they strongly eased that experience. A score of 3 indicated a neutral midpoint. Pride was measured on a zero to 3 scale, where zero indicated the participant was not at all proud of fellow statesmen's response to the pandemic and 3 indicated extreme pride.

Figure 3: Dollars Allocated to Same or Different-State Partners and Park Organizations Across Experiments



Note: The maximum amount that could be allocated in the Individual-Level Dictator's Game was $1.00, while the maximum amount that could be allocated in the Organization-Level games was $10.

Figure 3: Effects of State Identity and Economic Game Treatment on Amount Allocation



Note: Panels display linear predictions from OLS regressions of state identity, the economic game treatment, and the interaction of the two on the amount of money allocated. The maximum amount that could be allocated in the Individual-Level Dictator's Game was $1.00, while the maximum amount that could be allocated in the Organization-Level games was $10.

Appendix A: Detailed Regression Results

Table A.1: Regression of Identity on the Pandemic's Effect on a Sense of Community, COVID States Project Survey

VARIABLES	(1) Americans	(2) State Residents	(3) Neighborhood Residents
State Identity	0.600***	1.162***	0.781***
	(0.0357)	(0.0387)	(0.0317)
National Identity	0.761***	0.204***	0.367***
	(0.0441)	(0.0440)	(0.0429)
Gender			
Female	-0.196***	-0.148***	-0.113***
	(0.0182)	(0.0185)	(0.0202)
Genderqueer	-0.690***	-0.469***	-0.425***
	(0.0910)	(0.0776)	(0.0907)
Partisanship			
Democrat	0.0958*	0.0474	0.0522
	(0.0522)	(0.0486)	(0.0399)
Strong Partisanship	0.0198	0.0117	0.00664
	(0.0194)	(0.0218)	(0.0192)
Ideology			
Moderate	0.101**	0.0148	-0.0523*
	(0.0381)	(0.0381)	(0.0306)
Conservative	0.0122	0.00163	-0.0445
	(0.0617)	(0.0590)	(0.0478)
Education	-0.0132	0.00632	0.0307***
	(0.00984)	(0.00928)	(0.00807)
Constant	2.271***	2.466***	2.617***
	(0.0918)	(0.0806)	(0.0719)
Observations	15,542	15,511	15,502
R-squared	0.099	0.126	0.084

Note: Cell entries indicate OLS regression coefficients with clustered standard errors by state in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.2: Regression of Identity's Effects on State Pride and Fellow Residents' Impact on Experience of the Pandemic

VARIABLES	(1) Impact on Experience	(2) Pride in Residents
State Identity	0.900***	1.304***
	(0.0315)	(0.0285)
National Identity	0.0527	0.244***
	(0.0389)	(0.0352)
Gender		
Female	-0.166***	-0.0960***
	(0.0167)	(0.0151)
Genderqueer	-0.460***	-0.314***
	(0.0853)	(0.0769)
Partisanship		
Democrat	-0.0865***	-0.0300
	(0.0225)	(0.0204)
Party Strength	0.0315*	0.0579***
	(0.0169)	(0.0153)
Ideology		
Moderate	-0.0486**	0.0671***
	(0.0221)	(0.0200)
Conservative	-0.0112	0.0204
	(0.0260)	(0.0235)
Education	0.0166**	0.000442
	(0.00753)	(0.00681)
Constant	2.748***	0.740***
	(0.0453)	(0.0410)
Observations	15,558	15,562
R-squared	0.079	0.177

Note: Cell entries indicate OLS regression coefficients with clustered standard errors by state in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.3: Interaction of State Identity and Economic Game Treatments on Allocation Amounts

VARIABLES	(1) Individual-Level Dictator Game	(2) Individual-Level Dictator Game Full Sample	(3) Organization-Level Dictator Game	(4) Organization-Level Donation Game
Different State Partner/Park	0.0912**	-0.692	-1.730***	-2.024***
	(0.0399)	(0.559)	(0.362)	(0.616)
National Park Foundation				-0.308
				(0.625)
State Identity	0.227***	-0.701	1.892***	0.779
	(0.0498)	(0.685)	(0.436)	(0.738)
Interaction				
Different State x State ID	-0.218***	1.139	-1.449**	1.804*
	(0.0703)	(0.972)	(0.610)	(1.038)
National Park x State ID				0.803
				(1.036)
Constant	0.292***	1.060***	4.354***	4.268***
	(0.0288)	(0.400)	(0.249)	(0.453)
Observations	750	919	804	791
R-squared	0.029	0.002	0.214	0.049

Figure A.1: Distribution of State ID across all studies