



1 Introduction

Four decades ago, as a graduate student, I became interested in Mexican political leadership. In pursuit of a dissertation project, I developed a comparative study of the role of Mexican and U.S. economists in policy making, using a policy-making model developed by Charles O. Jones.¹ Through extensive correspondence, and later follow-up interviews in Mexico, I was introduced to an entire generation of Mexican public figures, many of whom lived through the Mexican Revolution of 1910 as children and who had made significant contributions to the postrevolutionary developments from the 1920s until the end of the twentieth century.² This generation of Mexican leaders, through their generosity and interest in my scholarly questions, steered me toward a lifelong project of exploring leaders and elites. I moved across professional boundaries, educating myself about Mexico's literary figures, artists, and others in the fascinating world of intellectual life; Catholic bishops and priests operating within the peculiar confines of Mexico's church and state history; capitalists and their tenuous relationship to the government; and the secretive officer corps, which succumbed to civilian supremacy while retaining protected spheres of autonomy long before its Latin American peers—all of whom were significantly linked, formally and informally, to political leaders.

Studying individual leaders is an indirect way of examining their institutions, regardless of whether they are businesses, churches, journals, interest groups, or armies. It is also a way of understanding how each of these many institutions relate to the Mexican state and the nature of the interactions that occur among them. After exploring these numerous leadership groups individually and then collectively, I decided to return a final time to politicians themselves, who initiated this focus, to fully understand how political leadership has evolved for most of the past century and where it

1. Roderic Ai Camp, *The Role of Economists in Policy-Making: A Comparative Case Study of Mexico and the United States* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977).

2. Most of these letters have been donated to the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas, Austin, Texas.

appears to be headed in this century, after the remarkable election of 2000. For this, I am indebted to Peter Siavelis, who reawakened my interest, after I spent a decade analyzing citizen views of democracy and democratic politics, by inviting me to Wake Forest University for the first conference ever held on political recruitment in Latin America.³

Essentially, I wanted to address two broad, fundamental questions. First, how has Mexican political leadership evolved from the 1930s to 2010? Specifically, how has the changing model of Mexican politics from a semi-authoritarian, one-party dominant to a consolidating democratic, competitive, electoral system significantly altered Mexican leadership in ways which extend beyond their ideological preferences?⁴ I want to make clear at the outset that I do not consider Mexico today to be a fully democratic political model. I view it as currently undergoing the process of consolidation.⁵ Therefore, my definition of Mexico as a democracy refers only to it having achieved a competitive, accountable, electoral process governed by independent institutions that the majority of citizens support.⁶ I also believe it has achieved a different if incomplete set of procedures that set it apart from the predemocratic era, implying a greater level of pluralism.⁷

3. The results of this groundbreaking conference can be found in Peter M. Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern, eds., *Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008).

4. My first foray into this topic, "Political Recruitment, Governance, and Leadership in Mexico: How Democracy Has Made a Difference," appears in Siavelis and Morgenstern, *Pathways to Power*, 292–315.

5. Dorothy J. Solinger provides a valuable comparative analysis of Mexico's arrival at the point of consolidation based on six structural factors: decades of elections, the existence of at least one opposition party during those decades, eventual electoral reforms, a high level of corruption and fraud in the ruling party, one or more fissures from the dominant party, and a charismatic opposition leader. "Ending One-Party Dominance: Korea, Taiwan, Mexico," *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 1 (January 2001): 31.

6. For a comprehensive discussion of scholarly views of democracy, including its very definition, see Steve Ellner's insightful "Latin American Democracy in 'Post-Consolidation' Literature: Optimism and Pessimism," *Latin American Politics and Society* 43, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 127–42. For my views in more detail, see Roderic Ai Camp, *Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 291ff. I have been most influenced in my own definition of democracy by Terry Lynn Karl's conceptualization and analysis of democracy in Latin America, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," in Roderic Ai Camp, ed., *Democracy in Latin America: Patterns and Cycles* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1996), 21–46.

7. For a careful analysis of the components of Mexican democracy and the difficulties in its transition, see Guy Poitras's excellent "Mexico's Problematic Transition to Democracy," in Philip Kelly, ed., *Assessing Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 63–75. For an in-depth analysis of emerging pluralism, Claudio Holzner uses Philip Oxhorn's terminology but labels it neopluralism, describing it as "characterized by a weakening of organized interests, a fragmented civil society, the persistence of clientelist forms of organization, technocratic elements in the government's dealings with individuals and groups, and the channeling of political participation into a narrow set of activities that don't effectively convey interests or affect policy." Claudio Holzner, *Poverty of Democracy: The Institutional Roots of Political Participation in Mexico* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009) and Philip

My second question is whether leadership changes between these two eras have been extensive, and if so, which features of Mexican leadership have been most altered by new institutional patterns, when did these changes actually take place, and why did they occur?

Given the resources available to me, I hoped to empirically test many questions that these broader issues raised. I devised two comprehensive data sets, which have taken forty years to complete. The most comprehensive is a data set that begins chronologically at June 1935, when Lázaro Cárdenas was president and freed himself from behind-the-scenes intervention and influence of his original mentor, Plutarco E. Calles, and continues through June 2009, during the third year of Felipe Calderón's presidency. This data set, a subset of my Mexican Political Biographies Project, contains extensive, detailed biographical information on nearly 3,000 influential national leaders, including cabinet secretaries, assistant secretaries, and *oficiales mayores* who represent the executive branch; supreme court justices, who represent the judicial branch; and repeating deputies and senators, who represent the legislative branch.⁸ All state governors are included as representatives of the most prominent regional leaders and because they have carved out a major role in national political leadership, a role that is definitely on the increase since the 1990s.⁹ Finally, I included influential political figures who do not qualify according to their more formal public positions, including guerrilla leaders, presidential candidates and party leaders of smaller political parties, and others who exerted a significant influence on elections and public policy.

To complement the information coded in the biographical data bank, I have attempted to bring the analysis of the data alive by incorporating extensive research based on published interviews in regional newspapers as well as appropriate, insightful excerpts from nearly a thousand interviews and personal correspondence from political figures representing every generation from the 1880s through the 1960s. These personal sources range from interviews and letters from seven presidents, dozens of cabinet members, assistant secretaries, supreme court justices, senators, governors, party presidents, and leading figures from all of the parties from the

Oxhorn and Graciela Ducatenzeiler, eds., *What Kind of Market? What Kind of Democracy? Latin America in the Age of Neoliberalism* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998).

8. These biographical entries are based on thousands of published sources including biographies, autobiographies, political histories, pamphlets, regional and national newspapers, regional and national magazines, scholarly articles, and books.

9. For example, see Rogelio Hernández Rodríguez, "The Renovation of Old Institutions: State Governors and the Political Transition in Mexico," *Latin American Politics and Society* 45, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 97–127, his *El centro dividido, la nueva autonomía de los gobernadores* (Mexico: El Colegio de México, 2008), and Rafael Morales Ramírez, "El Regreso de los gobernadores," *Este País* (February–March 2004): 39–43.

far left to the far right. Such sources provide a wealth of personal insight and observation in response to many of the questions raised in this study.

To test the numerous assumptions and hypotheses I have examined, I divided this data set into three chronological eras. The *predemocratic era* is defined by the years 1935 through 1988, incorporating the nine presidencies of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40), Manuel Avila Camacho (1940–46), Miguel Alemán (1946–52), Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952–58), Adolfo López Mateos (1958–64), Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–70), Luis Echeverría Alvarez (1970–76), José López Portillo (1976–82), and Miguel de la Madrid (1982–88). The second era, which I believed would produce significant differences from the preceding half a century, can be viewed as an era of *democratic transition*, consisting of the presidencies of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–94) and Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000). Finally, the third era, the *democratic period*, marked by the election of the first opposition party candidate for president since 1929, surveys the political leadership serving during the administrations of Vicente Fox (2000–2006) and Felipe Calderón (2006–9).

Using the same criteria for inclusion of individual politicians in the 2009 project, I also made use of a data set I created in 1994, also part of the larger Mexican Political Biographies Project, which examined leading public figures from 1884 through 1934, beginning with Porfirio Díaz and culminating with the first year of the Cárdenas administration. Thus, the two data sets combined, containing biographical entries for nearly 4,000 individual political figures, allows comparisons covering more than 125 years. As far as I know, this combined data set is the largest, most detailed compilation of political elites from the nineteenth century to the contemporary period that exists for any country.¹⁰

In addition to being able to analyze the data on the basis of the presidential administrations that populate the three distinct analytical eras, I created variables that allow us to analyze the data on the basis of the generation (the decade in which they were born) to which they belong, on whether they held positions in any individual presidential administration, and on the presidency during which they held their first-time high-level office qualifying them institutionally for inclusion in the data set. The justification for creating and using a broad generational category for analysis is that generations, not presidential administrations, often provide insights into significant shifts in leadership characteristics well before they exert

10. Most of the biographical data for the 1994 data set can be found in my *Mexican Political Biographies, 1884–1935* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991). The biographical data for the 2009 data set will be available in *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935–2009*, 4th ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), which will include a CD.

an impact in a given presidential period.¹¹ Also, generally two generations largely dominate individual presidential administrations.¹² The argument favoring the creation of a broad category of first-time office holders by administration is that it allows us to see the influence of each president on the changing composition of Mexican political leadership and introducing trends that may have an impact on that leadership for decades to come.¹³

Using these data, I began to address several more questions. First, how does the changing role of political institutions influence the characteristics and experiences of influential political leadership? For example, one would expect in a political model that underwent a change from a centralized political system to a democratic, decentralized system that the political setting and the new institutional political culture would promote an increase in the importance of local political experiences, elective or appointive.¹⁴ Political scientists have argued that local political experience in the United States played an influential role in the careers of important future politicians.¹⁵ Moreover, studies of Mexico conclude that the local political context is “a central feature affecting how one views the national political system” and that “local context, perceptions of the system, and political behavior are intimately connected.”¹⁶ There is no reason to believe that their findings would not apply to local politicians who eventually succeeded at the national level. Thus, an increase in the diversity and depth of local experiences also affects leadership behavior. I discovered, however, that some of our intuitive judgments anticipating these changes, as logical as they might seem, turn out to be incorrect.

To illustrate this very point, the evidence from the data shows that between 1935 and 2000 the percentage of prominent national political leaders who

11. Some of the sources on generational influences that most have affected my own vision include Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), 276–322; Philip H. Burch, *Elites in American History*, 3 vols. (New York: Homes and Meier, 1981); Alan B. Spitzer, “The Historical Problem of Generations,” *American Historical Review* 78 (December 1973): 1353–85; and Marvin Rintala, “A Generation in Politics: A Definition,” *Review of Politics* 25 (1963): 509–22.

12. I discovered this pattern in the early 1970s and discuss it in *Mexico’s Leaders: Their Education and Recruitment* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1980), 49–50.

13. I explore these arguments in more detail in “Age as a Variable in Political Recruitment,” in *Political Recruitment across Two Centuries, Mexico, 1884–1991* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), 37–57.

14. For the changing levels of regional participation, contributing to a more favorable environment toward electoral competition, see my “Province versus the Center: Democratizing Mexico’s Political Culture,” in Philip Kelly, ed., *Assessing Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 76–92.

15. Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1966), 33–34.

16. John T. Hiskey, “Local Context and Democratization in Mexico,” *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 1 (January 2005): 57.

formerly were mayors reached its highest level under President Díaz Ordaz (1964–70), who many analysts would describe as the most (or at the very least among the most) authoritarian of the predemocratic presidents.¹⁷ But as the data revealed, there is a logical explanation for this earlier upsurge. On the other hand, the far more important pattern that emerges to illustrate the broader trend over time and support the intuitive notion grounded on early studies of the American democratic model, is that the highest number of former mayors reaching national posts occurred under Fox and Calderón, the two democratic presidents.¹⁸ Moreover, from 1988 to 2000, as the democratic transition ensued, the pattern of increased local electoral experience among politicians became well established, increasing dramatically in contrast to all prominent politicians serving from 1970 to 1988.¹⁹

A second, equally broad question focuses on the extent to which informal (in contrast to formal) characteristics have an impact on leadership composition. For example, are informal qualities, such as kinship ties, as affected by democratic electoral competition as institutional consequences are? Throughout my previous leadership studies, I have noted the importance of family ties in Mexican politics as a means of linking political generations together and as a critical variable in determining access to and upward mobility through the leadership ladder.²⁰ One means of defining a changing leadership, especially one that might be altered by institutional change in the political model, is the degree to which the pool of politicians is altered by a more open and competitive process.

Political experience, measured by the type of offices a generation of political figures held previously, suggests certain changes, but not more than the extent to which politicians in one era were the products of important

17. For example, see George Philip's argument that Díaz Ordaz "was an outsider... who had made it to the top. Insecurity of status allied to personal ambition may have accentuated his interest in order and power, and his lack of sympathy with democracy or the 'values of 1968.'" *The Presidency in Mexican Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 63.

18. For example, see the evidence presented in Joy Langston and Francisco Javier Aparicio, "Political Career Structures in Democratic Mexico, 1997–2006," paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 28–31, 2008.

19. Interestingly, an international organization founded in 1989, Partners for Change Democratically, began training individuals to implement democracy through increased participation and negotiation. Mexico is one of their country partners, and their affiliate is Socio México/Centro de Colaboración Cívica, A.C. See www.partnersglobal.org/network/mexico, May 7, 2010.

20. Roderic Ai Camp, "Family Relationships in Mexican Politics: A Preliminary View," *Journal of Politics* 44, no. 3 (August 1982): 848–62, and "Camarillas in Mexican Politics, the Case of the Salinas Cabinet," *Journal of Mexican Studies* 6, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 85–108. For a comparative view, see Keith R. Legg, "Interpersonal Relationships and Comparative Politics: Political Clientelism in Industrial Societies," *Politics* 7, no. 1 (May 1972): 1–11. For another Latin American country, see Peter McDonough, *Power and Ideology in Brazil* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981).

political families in another. In other words, how different is the pool of democratic politicians from their predemocratic and transitional peers? Because the data set is so chronologically broad, I have been able to trace such familial linkages through more than ten generations.²¹ Perhaps even more interesting, I also have tracked to some degree the extent to which contemporary politicians are related to historically important figures from the Porfirian elite or to their opponents among the revolutionary leadership, civilian and military alike.²²

No variable is more difficult to ascertain than a politician's family background and socioeconomic origin. I have been able to provide precise, reliable information on these informal qualities for approximately half of the politicians analyzed. The rapid expansion of the Internet in Mexico allowed me to delve into local newspapers and other valuable local and national sources, adding significantly to our knowledge about individual politicians and their extended families. If anything, I would argue that my figures substantially undervalue the extent of such linkages, whether one is referring to historically important family ties extending back to the nineteenth or early decades of the twentieth century or to extended family members who have been deeply involved in local, state, and national politics.²³

A single example analyzed in the chapter on local politics illustrates that during the years of the combined data sets from the 1880s to the present, four families in one community were known to have held the post of mayor nearly two-thirds of those years, from the first to the present decade.²⁴

21. The depth of family linkages vary from one culture to another, with North America characterized by weak linkages. Although he emphasizes these differences as a basis for formulating social policies, David Sven Rehner offers interesting insights into the importance of such patterns in "Family Ties in Western Europe: Persistent Contrasts," *Population and Development Review* 24, no. 2 (June 1998): 203–34.

22. For a comparative, historical perspective from Brazil, see Linda Lewin, "Some Historical Implications of Kinship Organization for Family-Based Politics in the Brazilian Northeast," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21, no. 2 (April 1979): 262–92. For linkages within the Porfirian elite, see Armando Razo, *Social Foundations of Limited Dictatorship: Networks and Private Protection during Mexico's Early Industrialization* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008).

23. For extensive examples at the state and regional levels, see Mark Wasserman, *Persistent Oligarchs: The Political Economy of Chihuahua, Mexico, 1880–1940* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993); Stuart Voss, "Northwest Mexico," in Diana Balmori, Stuart Voss, and Miles Wortman, eds., *Notable Family Networks in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and Hector Aguilar Camín, *La frontera nomada: Sonora y la revolución mexicana* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1977). One of the most comprehensive studies of family political ties straddling the revolutionary period through the 1990s is Javier Hurtado's outstanding *Familias, política y parentesco, Jalisco 1919–1991* (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1993).

24. These four families were represented forty-one out of sixty-seven times in Espinal, Oaxaca. The names can be found in the Espinal Web site through www.e-local.gob.mx/wb2/local. For comparable data on family influence among mayors in Brazil, and their ability

Thus, informal variables can sustain influences across historical periods and different political models, having their own impact on who reaches political office and thus on decision making.

A third question that has particular relevance to the arrival of democratic politics in Mexico concerns the extent of partisanship among Mexican politicians and how the importance of active party involvement and office-holding has changed as the institutional influence of political parties grew dramatically in the past two decades. I previously compared small groups of National Action Party (PAN) and Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) politicians, which revealed some important differences between the two groups.²⁵ But the role of partisanship among leading politicians has not been well examined largely because we have not accumulated adequate data to accomplish such an exploration over multiple decades.²⁶ Most analysts believe that during the years PRI maintained a virtual monopoly over the executive and judicial branches (which allowed few opposition victories in the legislative branch and none among state governors) that PRI partisanship would be extensive given its centralized control and party discipline.²⁷

As I discovered, however, the reality of strong partisanship during the predemocratic era did not follow this expected pattern. Indeed, I found that only a small minority of PRI members (one in three) ever held a party position. In contrast, nearly eight out of ten PAN members held state or national party posts. When I surveyed political leaders' level of militancy, I discovered that only a third of PRI politicians during the predemocratic era could be considered militant rather than nominal party members! On the other

to transcend the change from dictatorship to democracy, see Claudio Ferraz and Federico Finan's conclusion that 31 percent of influential political families within a municipality were able to survive the change. "Political Power Persistence and Economic Development: Evidence from Brazil's Regime Transition," paper presented at the Conference on the Role of Elites in Economic Development, United Nations University-Wider, Helsinki, Finland, June 12-13, 2009, 6.

25. Roderic Ai Camp and Donald Mabry, "Mexican Political Elites 1935-1973: A Comparative Study," *Americas* 31, no. 4 (April 1975): 452-69.

26. The classic studies in American politics are Lewis Bowman and G. R. Boynton, "Recruitment Patterns among Local Party Officials: A Model and Some Preliminary Findings in Selected Locales," *American Political Science Review* 60, no. 3 (September 1966): 667-76, and Lester G. Seligman, "Political Recruitment and Party Structure: A Case Study," *American Political Science Review* 55, no. 1 (March 1961): 77-86, but they provide only limited insight into politicians pursuing national political careers. The best work remains Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States* (New York: Rand McNally, 1966).

27. For comments on the degree of centralized control within the party, see Dale Story, *The Mexican Ruling Party: Stability and Authority* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1986), 77ff. For the changes in disciplinary control by the party, see Joseph Klesner, "The End of Mexico's One Party Regime," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 34 (2001): 107-14.

hand, an examination of PAN members in the democratic era, in contrast to PRI, revealed the importance of party militancy among its leading politicians, including those achieving top posts in the executive branch. As I demonstrate in chapter 3, institutional variables, including the structure and role the party has played in the evolution of PAN's leadership, explains the huge differences in militant levels between PRI versus PAN and Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) politicians. Nevertheless, I also discovered that the larger political setting characterized by competitive electoral politics since 2000 produced similar recent trends among PRI politicians.

A fourth question I hoped to address in this study is to what extent has the advent of a democratic electoral process altered basic demographic characteristics among Mexican leadership, including their social and geographic origins? A number of demographic changes occurred among prominent political leadership over the past century. Not surprisingly, Mexican public life is overwhelming dominated by individuals who came from middle-class backgrounds. Middle-class politicians reached their apex under President Fox, but more interesting is the fact that the truly significant shift in the distribution of working and middle-class politicians actually occurred under Luis Echeverría, long before the democratic transition or the democratic era itself began.²⁸ One can offer several explanations for this change, including the fact that the beginning of Echeverría's presidency followed two decades of sustained economic growth.²⁹ It is also worth noting that the generations that dominated his presidency were the immediate products of postrevolutionary Mexico in the 1920s and 1930s. I also discovered the significance of social class in determining career preferences among leading politicians by branch of government, and how working class politicians have nearly disappeared from the judicial and executive branch leadership since the initiation of electoral democracy at the presidential level in 2000.³⁰

28. Middle-class origins of national politicians is common in most other societies. For example, see Anthony Mughan and Samuel C. Patterson, eds., *Political Leadership in Democratic Societies* (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1992), 119ff.

29. It is worth keeping in mind that Ronald Inglehart, using a wealth of data from the World Values Survey, has reached the conclusion that that "a massive body of evidence suggests that modernization theory's central premise was correct: economic development does tend to bring about important, roughly predictable changes in society, culture, and politics. But earlier versions of modernization theory need to be corrected in several respects." See Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, "How Development Leads to Democracy: What We Know about Modernization," *Foreign Affairs* (March–April 2009): 37.

30. Social class, defined by levels of income, also produce significant differences among ordinary Mexican citizens in their basic conceptions of democracy, especially the principles of freedom of expression, liberty, equality, and the right to choose one's leaders. See Pablo Parás and Ken Coleman, *The Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico: 2006*, Latin American Public Opinion Project, December 2006.

Throughout these many years, I have been interested in gender issues related to leadership. As a result of that interest, and my earlier studies before the democratic transition began, I predicted (along with other analysts) that women would benefit from the advent of a democratic electoral process because they were heavily involved in grassroots organizations with participatory, democratic structures. These organizations honed women's skills in negotiating and leadership based on the principle of compromise.³¹ To examine gender patterns and their impact carefully over long periods of time, I looked at women who were elected only once as members of congress and the senate, similar to the criteria I applied to early members of PAN and the Left before they achieved broad access to top political offices, to create a sufficient sample from which to draw credible conclusions.

Thus, I wanted to test whether the advent of electoral competition did indeed enhance the representation of women among leading political figures. As I will demonstrate, there is no question that women have increased their presence among top leadership since 2000, more than doubling their numbers. What is even more interesting, however, is that significant increases in female politicians already were occurring toward the end of the predemocratic era in the 1970s and 1980s, even before the democratic transition—but the transition reinforced and expanded their presence. One of the major discoveries in my analysis of gender patterns is that by altering the institutional patterns of how deputies would be selected and elected, the PRI enhanced political opportunities for women, who were best represented in the legislative branch.

By increasing the presence of women, the appearance of a democratic model also altered the overall composition of leading Mexican politicians. This is because the women elected differed from the elected men in many ways, including their educational levels and emphasis, political career experiences, and concentration on elective careers in the legislative branch. I discovered (and this finding is reinforced elsewhere in the study) that democratic change produced far greater consequences in the legislative branch than in any other institutional arena in government. The data also demonstrated that the expanded presence of women provided an equally important increase in party militancy, which in turn was linked to a career focus within the legislative branch, both national and state. In the long run, these and other changes wrought by women (because legislative careers rose in importance for leading politicians under Calderón), affect

31. I made this argument in "Women and Men, Men and Women: Gender Patterns in Mexican Politics," in Victoria Rodríguez, ed., *Women's Participation in Mexican Political Life* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 176.

the composition of leadership in the other branches of government, notably in the executive.³²

My dissertation research led me indirectly to the theme of the importance of economists in Mexican public life. Economist-politicians took on greater visibility under President Salinas in the late 1980s, as they did elsewhere in Latin America. As I discovered in the late 1960s, their influence was already well under way, and they began making their mark in the administrations of José López Portillo and Miguel de la Madrid.³³ If we think of technocratic leadership, whatever its credentials, as having altered the makeup of Mexican politicians, we can go as far back as the *científicos* during the Porfiriato.³⁴ Having identified the growing influence of certain educational credentials among leading politicians in earlier studies, I began to see the importance of formal educational credentials defining a new generation of leaders well before the highly publicized technocratic generation at the end of the twentieth century.³⁵

Has Mexico been characterized by more than one technocratic generation, and how has that generation molded top leadership generally? I make the argument that Mexico has witnessed two technocratic waves in the twentieth century and the beginning of a third wave under President Calderón. The initial technocratic wave is represented by the rise of civilian lawyers under Miguel Alemán, the first full-term civilian president since 1920. His generation represents the influence of college-educated leadership in Mexican politics, the importance of college professors and students in the recruitment of political leadership, and the dominance of

32. It also has been empirically demonstrated that those members of congress who have prior experience as a deputy or a senator are far more likely to obtain positions as committee chairs in the Chamber of Deputies, regardless of party. See D. Xavier Medina Vidal, Antonio Ugues Jr., and Shaun Bowler, "Experience Counts: The Revolving Door of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies," paper presented at the Western Political Science Association, Vancouver, British Columbia, 2009.

33. For the various versions of these public figures in individual Latin American countries, see Jorge I. Domínguez, *Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). For the best description of the evolution of this movement, see Veronica Montecinos and John Markoff's excellent studies "The Ubiquitous Rise of Economists," *Journal of Public Policy* 13, no. 1 (1993): 37-68 and "From the Power of Economic Ideas to the Power of Economists," in Miguel A. Centeno, ed., *The Other Mirror: Essays on Latin America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). Raymond Vernon, a leading economist, was the first scholar to take note of this growing influence in his prescient *The Dilemma of Mexico's Development: The Roles of the Private and Public Sectors* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

34. For a detailed characterization of this group, see Charles A. Hale's wonderful *Transformation of Liberalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Mexico* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 121ff.

35. "The Middle-Level Technocrat in Mexico," *Journal of Developing Areas* 6 (July 1972): 571-82 and "Education and Political Recruitment in Mexico: The Alemán Generation," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 18 (August 1976): 295-321.

the two national educational institutions on the recruitment and socialization of Mexican leadership, both centered in the Federal District. The Alemán generation reinforced the importance of the federal executive branch and highlighted national bureaucratic office as the most desirable post for future ambitious politicians to seek.

The Alemán generation's influence extends well beyond providing a technocratic precedent early in the twentieth century. The characteristics of this generation establish institutional patterns that affect the composition of leadership for the remainder of the century, as well as after 2000; therefore, they are examined extensively. For example, two patterns this group accentuated—geographic concentration from the Federal District and the influence of two institutional sources of leadership in the same locale—affect the presence of dozens of other background variables, many of which are influential among politicians from other eras or cultures. Young people who develop political ambitions and are successful in filling those ambitions understand these patterns and take measures to become part of them. Thus, they move to the Federal District because they realize beforehand that they will be able to associate with others who can open the doors to their political ambitions. In making that choice, they devalue other sources of institutional recruitment, such as local political office and local party activities. Furthermore, Alemán and his collaborators failed to expand political liberties and participation, a goal many of them professed as student activists. The Alemán generation's disciples perpetuated many of these patterns and perceptions, and they continued to do so for years to come.

The emergence of the more well-known economic technocrats of the Salinas era actually contributed to the deep divisions within PRI leadership, which fomented democratic change in the 1980s. Precisely the conflict between this wing and the nontechnocratic PRI wing led by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo resulted in the splintering of the party and the founding of the PRD shortly after Cárdenas's landmark but unsuccessful opposition presidential campaign in 1988.³⁶ This second technocratic wave boasted its own set of credentials, establishing Mexican leadership as having postgraduate education, specialized training in economics, and most important, advanced studies from U.S. Ivy League schools.³⁷

36. For the critical consequences of this election, see my "Mexico's 1988 Elections: A Turning Point for Its Political Development and Foreign Relations," in Edgar W. Butler and Jorge A. Bustamante, eds., *Sucesion Presidencial: The 1988 Mexican Presidential Election* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 245–62. This book provides the most comprehensive views on this benchmark election.

37. "The Technocrat in Mexico and the Survival of the Political System," *Latin American Research Review* 20, no. 1 (1985): 97–118.

The initiation of democratic politics moderated the impact of the second technocratic wave while introducing a third wave, notable for its different educational specializations extending well beyond economics into numerous contemporary fields, including communications, computer technology, and advanced engineering in multiple, esoteric disciplines. This wave took on additional features that were defined by the presence of PAN members in the most influential policy-making positions and reversed some of the more pronounced trends found in the second wave, including the emphasis on U.S. graduate education. Democratic politics increased the diversification of educational training in this third wave while simultaneously continuing to place an emphasis on specialization.

The basic characteristics found among all prominent politicians are not homogeneous. In fact, when essential demographic and career experiences of leading public figures in Mexico are examined, significant patterns that strongly impact diversity within that leadership quickly surface. I speculated that since the democratic era began, electoral democracy would increase the regional diversity of Mexico's leadership. The logic underlying this assumption was that the increasing competition—opening the doors to candidates from other parties—occurred unevenly at the local and state levels.³⁸ Is this the case? For example, an examination of leading politicians' career paths suggests that those figures who represent executive branch careers are much more likely than all other prominent politicians to have come from the Federal District. In fact, four out of ten assistant secretaries of cabinet-level agencies come from this single entity. Given the appointive powers of cabinet secretaries and the fact that numerous assistant secretaries go on to hold cabinet posts, the importance of this geographic bias increases. A comparison of the regional origins of predemocratic with democratic executive branch officials and supreme court justices (representing the judicial branch) reveals a huge increase in politicians coming from the capital. This is also the case in the legislative branch, but the overall percentages are no match for the portions found in the other two branches. One would expect some increase in leading figures coming from the Federal District since its population from 1920 to 1950 nearly doubled from 6 to 12 percent. But the percentage of leading politicians far exceeds

38. Interestingly, at least among Western democracies, once democratic institutions were in place, little variation in geographic origins occurred over time. Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman, *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 78. In the transition from communism to the first phase of democracy in Russia, a survey of the literature suggests that considerable continuity in leadership at the local level existed, but so did substantial change. Stephen White and Olga Kryshтанouskaya report these conclusions in "Russia: Elite Continuity and Change," in Mattei Dogan and John Higley, eds., *Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 126.

those percentages, regardless of the generation examined. Democracy definitely has produced a change in the distribution of birthplaces among leading political figures, but it has reduced rather than increased geographic diversity.³⁹

Throughout much of the book I use generational data to test a number of questions, believing that age provides a critical measurement of identifying and analyzing new leadership trends. This is because generations are distributed among presidencies, whether they are confined to first-time high-level officeholders or include repeat performers. I believe that generational differences influence ideological differences, which affect policy positions and the ability of politicians to accomplish legislative compromise.⁴⁰ I expected that the two former opposition parties, especially the PAN, would consist of younger politicians compared to their counterparts in the PRI. Again, if one thinks of democratic competition and a democratic opening as diversifying the pool of leading political figures, the distribution of birthdates among leading figures confirms that hypothesis. Generally, PRD partisans were even younger than their PAN peers; more important, both were significantly younger than the PRIistas, thus increasing the presence of a younger generation in the mix of ages in this leadership.

Career differences are equally valuable in understanding the distribution of informal characteristics. Intuitively, one might expect democratic competition to decrease the percentage of top political figures who were related to other individuals active in politics. Does this turn out to be confirmed by the data? Overall, nearly half of all cabinet secretaries were related to other political figures. When this figure is compared to the post-2000 era leaders, the percentage of cabinet secretaries with such kinship ties does decrease significantly, suggesting that the appearance of PAN and to a lesser degree PRD politicians in larger numbers has broadened the pool

39. In my earlier work on a highly selective group of influential figures from all sectors of society, I found that 70 percent of these “power elites” spent most of their adult lives in just three cities: Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey. Birthplace and residence have significant consequences for political, economic, and social networking. Roderic Ai Camp, *Mexico's Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-first Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 67ff.

40. Christopher Díaz, in his study of bill initiation in the Chamber of Deputies from 1994 to 2003, found that PRI members were, “with their colleagues in other parties, very much involved in strengthening the Chamber as a political institution by, among other activities, initiating legislation.... Were it not for the democratic transition, it seems unlikely that any of the changes in PRI deputy behavior discussed in this study would have taken place. For PRI deputies in particular, the advent of divided government has challenged them to become more active in promoting their party’s interests, and by extension their own interests, than previous generations of PRI deputies.” “Do ‘Nuevo PRI’ Deputies in Mexico Legislate Differently Than Their ‘Dinosaurio’ Predecessors? A Preliminary Analysis of Bill Initiation in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies,” paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association, Las Vegas, Nevada, October 7–9, 2004. 13.

of potential political leaders. However, this is not universally true because little decline occurred among top figures in the judicial branch.

Career patterns also affected the source of politicians' education. Again, as was the case of kinship ties, democratic electoral change produced numerous trends contributing to the diversity of political leadership. Perhaps the most notable was the decline in graduates from public universities in Mexico City, particularly the National University, and the concomitant rise of state universities as the alma mater among numerous younger politicians.⁴¹

Of all the variables examined in this study, perhaps the most controversial is the degree to which non-violent and violent alterations in a political model produce similarly dramatic changes. I believed that democratic change would produce consequences for political leadership that would affect as many variables as violent change. What I discovered, however, is that non-violent change can be as dramatic, or more so, than violent change, and that some of those changes may actually occur in the opposite direction.

I want to be explicit, as I am in chapter 8, that I am referring to the major conflicts that occurred during the decade of 1910–20. I do not attempt to define that violence in any other way for the purposes of my analysis, especially not implying the degree to which Mexico actually underwent a social revolution, a highly contentious issue among historians, as a result of these civil conflicts.⁴² What we do know is that approximately two million Mexicans (out of fifteen million) were lost to Mexico, because they either died directly or indirectly from the conflicts that took place during this decade, or were never born, and those experiences affected the vast majority of Mexicans for decades after.⁴³ As Jack Womack Jr. has suggested, violence can be defined in many ways, including doing violence to the Mexican poor. He also stated that other, singular violent events took place after these conflicts, including the assassination of Luis Donaldo

41. For my early speculations about these educational patterns on political life, see my "Review: Education and Politics, Politics and Education, Mexico in the 20th Century," *History of Education Quarterly* 25 (Summer 1985): 215–20.

42. For a detailed analysis of how revolution and democracy have been used in the Latin American context, see Alan Knight's enlightening, in-depth overview in "Democratic and Revolutionary Traditions in Latin America," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 20, no. 2 (2001): 147–86.

43. Robert McCaa, "Missing Millions: The Demographic Costs of the Mexican Revolution," *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos* 19, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 367–400. These figures include "excess deaths," lost births, and a small percentage of emigrants. For the long-term impact on ordinary families, see Linda S. Stevenson and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Fading Memories of the Revolution: Is Stability Eroding in Mexico?" in Roderic Ai Camp, ed., *Polling for Democracy: Public Opinion and Political Liberalization in Mexico* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1996), 59–80.

Colosio during the presidential campaign of 1994, which clearly produced its own political consequences.⁴⁴ Whatever other forms of violence have occurred in Mexico, none approached the impact of the extensive armed violence of that decade and its potential consequences for altering political leadership.

In an era when four-fifths of Mexicans lived in villages and towns of fewer than 2,500 residents, one would expect the violent upheavals that took place in the decade of 1910–20 to have dramatically increased the percentage of politicians from rural backgrounds in the 1920s' administrations. The percentage of politicians with rural birthplaces from the 1920–28 administration's dominant generation did increase, but by only 12 percent. As a consequence of nonviolent electoral change in 2000, the rural backgrounds of the 1950s generation unexpectedly increased by 20 percent, exceeding the extent of the change occurring eighty years previously.

Equally important changes occurred in the place of birth among Mexican politicians. I expected the numbers of leading figures born in the Federal District to decline significantly, complementary to the increase in rural birthplaces, because most of the combatants in the revolution were products of the provinces. This was indeed the case, as the politicians from the capital declined dramatically by 64 percent, the highest regional change among all seven regions. Nevertheless, the democratic era witnessed a dramatic 72 percent increase in politicians *from* the Federal District—again greater than what took place after a decade of violence. In six out of the seven regions, nonviolent periods resulted in significantly more dramatic change than did violent periods.

If some of the most influential informal characteristics of prominent Mexican political figures are examined, similar patterns are encountered. For example, I would predict that in both cases of violent and nonviolent change, the numbers of politicians with family members who held important political and military posts would decline, given the altered pool from which a new generation of politicians emerged in the 1920s and 2000s. Given the deep ideological and social class differences between the prerevolutionary and postrevolutionary cohorts, I would expect those changes to be far more dramatic among the generations produced by violent conflict. Politicians with such family connections do decrease in both decades, but by the same percentages, with the democratic generation having slightly fewer such family ties.

Perhaps the most interesting of the variables that might be affected by a change in the political model is politicians' prior career experiences. Several such experiences that I examined included local offices, business management or ownership, and military careers. Among

44. Personal communication with the author, March 7, 2009.

postrevolutionary leadership I might expect the percentage holding local political offices and having reached the rank of colonel in the military to increase significantly, given the origins of those generations. On the other hand, I would also expect important business backgrounds, common in the Porfiriato, to decline substantially. Local office holding increased by nearly half, whereas business backgrounds declined by nearly three-quarters. Politicians with military backgrounds increased 15 percent. Eighty years later, after the election of 2000, an examination of the same variables revealed that politicians with local political experience increased a whopping 170 percent, and those with business backgrounds, which I also would have expected to increase, did so by an equally dramatic 140 percent.⁴⁵ Politicians with military careers declined by nearly two-thirds, an equally significant figure. In short, a comparison of all three variables, regardless of the direction of the change, clearly demonstrates nonviolent consequences to be more formidable than their violent counterparts.

To speculate about the future of national leadership, I also explore the impact of governorships on prominent national politicians and on the composition of that leadership. Given the fact the five of the six leading candidates for the presidency in 2000 and 2006 were former governors, it is not unreasonable to expect that former governors may play an increasingly influential role in determining the composition of the future political elite as cabinet secretaries and presidents.⁴⁶ The fundamental question raised by this pattern is the following: are governors and former governors who hold national political office different from other leading politicians in their formal and informal background variables, and if so, what are these differences and their potential consequences for national leadership in the coming decades?

45. It is worthwhile to note that a recent examination of Chinese leadership concluded that the Central Committee of the Communist Party made a decision in the 1980s to promote lower level bureaucrats to the top on the basis of performance targets, for example, their ability to attract foreign investment. Thus, skills valued in the private sector, which have become increasingly found among Mexican politicians since 2000, have been identified along with political skills as essential to success in China. See Xiaowei Zang, "The Elite Incentives and Capacity in Governing Growth in China," paper presented at the Conference on the Role of Elites in Economic Development, United Nations University-Wider, Helsinki, Finland, June 12–13, 2009, 17–19.

46. In a comparative study of Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia, Tulia Falleti argued that as a consequence of decisions made by a technocratic leadership, beginning during the administration of José López Portillo, by 1999, on the cusp of the democratic shift, the power of subnational executives (specifically governors) increased. "Governing Governors: Decentralization Trajectories and Balance of Power in Argentina, Mexico, and Columbia, 1978–1999," paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 29–September 1, 2002, 36. Falleti published a broader argument of her decentralization theses in "A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective," *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 3 (2005): 327–46.

Some of the broader findings mentioned here can be attributed to the presence of prominent leaders with backgrounds as state governors.⁴⁷ Governors, for example, are increasingly from rural origins and have prior experiences in elective local office as mayors and state legislators, have business administration degrees and degrees from regional public institutions, are not college educated or have graduate training from schools other than those in the United States, have significant business experiences, have prior legislative careers, and have family with political or revolutionary experiences.

Finally, although I have excluded the impact of the consequences of the many patterns discovered in my analysis on generations of politicians' policy decisions (because it goes well beyond the scope of this study and involves variables too numerous to incorporate), I have added a final chapter on the Alemán generation, which consists of his college generation (1926–30), his preceding college generation (1921–25), and the immediately following college generation (1931–35). This analysis is based on data and extensive interviews and correspondence with numerous members of his generation, including Alemán himself. I have explored in detail the impact of this generation on the structure of Mexican political leadership, describing the actual and potential consequences on recruitment and socialization, or what Alan Knight aptly labels the *modus operandi* or way of doing politics, especially as it applies to the mass public. "One has to be careful not to mask how leaders get, retain and use power, by focusing on leadership characteristics."⁴⁸ I also have devoted equal attention to this generation's views and that of North American and Mexican scholars' interpretations of the impact of this group on public policy, exploring the linkage between what they claimed to have valued as a generation and the degree to which they actually concretely implemented those goals.⁴⁹ I believe this analysis demonstrates that this generation did have a long-term effect on the sources of

47. For fascinating insights into how recruitment patterns altered the selection of governors and increased the time frame from which local political leaders could conceivably be elected governors, see the views of a public policy official in the Mexican presidency: Alain de Remes, "Democratization and Dispersion of Power: New Scenarios in Mexican Federalism," *Mexican Studies* 22, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 175–204. De Remes further analyzes the important impact these changes have had on federalism.

48. Personal communication with the author, February 24, 2009. As Knight correctly notes, for example, one cannot just examine the continuity of political families through different eras, but the way in which those particular political figures function in the political world and how they interact with other political actors, including various constituencies.

49. One of the few efforts I have come across that links elite views empirically to public policies, in this case poverty alleviation, in Latin America, is Elisa P. Reis's recent examination of Brazil, "Poverty and Inequality in the Eyes of the Elites," paper presented at the Conference on the Role of Elites in Economic Development, United Nations University-Wider, Helsinki, Finland, June 12–13, 2009.

political leadership and therefore on the structure of the political system, given the PRI's monopoly. The changes that took place under this generation in the composition of leadership was as dramatic (or more so) as those that occurred under Fox and Calderón, suggesting just how influential this group came to be through its impact on the predemocratic era. In contrast, although they did have a significant impact on public policy, especially the issue of political order and unity, state intervention in the economy, and pragmatic decision making, they failed to implement another crucial leading tenet of their early beliefs—political liberty—which helped perpetuate the political model through the second half of the twentieth century.