Pei, Minxin. “2020 Look Ahead: China Will be Punching Bag in US Presidential Election.” Nikkei Asia, January 1,
Pei, Minxin. “China and the US Must Fight Covid-19 Together.” Financial Times, March 28, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “China and the US Risk Accidental War Over Taiwan.” Nikkei Asia, October 29, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “China: From Tiananmen to Neo-Stalinism.” Journal of
Democracy, vol. 31, no. 1, 2020, pp. 148-157.
Abstract: China's reversion to hard authoritarianism is no aberration. The development strategy formulated by Deng Xiaoping to modernize the Chinese economy under one-party rule generated endemic corruption and regime
decay, but failed to institute genuine and enforceable political reforms that would prevent the return of a Mao-like figure. China's great leap backward since 2012 may dim the hopes of gradual evolutionary regime transition, but the
pitfalls of strongman rule, dissipating economic dynamism under state capitalism, and escalating strategic competition with the United States will most likely reduce the long-term odds of the survival of the Chinese Communist Party.
Pei, Minxin. “China is Losing the Battle for Europe’s Hearts and Minds.” Nikkei Asia, September 14, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “China Must Avoid Provoking US with Threats to Taiwan.” Nikkei Asia, June 7, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “China Needs an Exit Strategy from Xinjiang.” Nikkei Asia, August 8, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “China's Coming Upheaval: Competition, the Coronavirus, and the Weakness of Xi Jinping.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 99,
issue 3, 2020, pp. 82-95.
Abstract: This article analyzes internal rigidities of the Chinese one-party regime and the likely crises it will face in the course of competing with the U.S. for geopolitical advantages.
Pei, Minxin. “China’s Deepening Geopolitical Hole.” Project Syndicate, July 16,
Pei, Minxin. “China’s Economic Bullying Will Never Work.” Nikkei Asia, July 8, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “China’s Expensive Bet on Africa Has Failed.” Nikkei Asia, May 1, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “China's Fateful Inward Turn: Beijing's New Economic Strategy as Spelled Out by the Resolution of the CCP Central Committee's 5th Plenum.” China Leadership Monitor,
December 16, 2020.
Abstract: At the 5th plenum of the 19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the end of October 2020, Chinese leaders unveiled a new strategy for sustaining economic development during the next fifteen
years. General Secretary Xi Jinping was deeply involved in the formulation of the framework underpinning the new strategy. Although aspirational and lacking in specifics, China's new economic strategy makes it clear that Beijing will be
shifting the focus of its economy inward and achieving scientific and technological self-sufficiency to improve its national security and sustain growth. Chinese leaders frame the rationale for this shift in terms of a response to radical
and unfavorable changes in the external environment. They also will rely on a new "whole-of-nation" system to mobilize resources to achieve their objectives. The immediate political objective of issuing this economic blueprint seems to
reassure the Chinese nation that the CCP has a plan to sustain its strategic competition with the U.S.
Pei, Minxin. “China’s Green Gambit.” Project Syndicate, December 18, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “China’s Misplaced Pandemic Propaganda.” Project Syndicate, March 26, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “China’s National People’s Congress Meeting Needs Substance, Not Slogans.” Nikkei Asia, May 20,
Pei, Minxin. “China’s Pro-Monopoly Anti-Trust Crusade.” Project Syndicate, December 31, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “China's Social Credit System: Genesis, Framework, and Key Provisions.” China Leadership Monitor, March 1, 2020.
Abstract: The Chinese government launched an ambitious program to build a social credit system in 2014. During the last six years, the State Council issued several key documents that seek to define the objectives and key
parameters of such a system. Based on these documents and reports on the progress of the system in the media, it is evident that the Chinese government has made significant progress in conceptualizing and specifying the functionalities of
its social credit system. At the moment, Beijing's current approach remains experimental, seeking to gradually improve the design and capabilities of the system through trial-and-error at the local levels. Judging by the ambitious goals set
forth in the State Council's outline document issued in 2014, actual progress in building the system may be limited due to the immense technological and administrative challenges.
Pei, Minxin. “Chinese Diplomats Behaving Badly.” Project Syndicate, June 9,
Pei, Minxin. “The Coronavirus is a Disease of Chinese Autocracy.” Project
Syndicate, January 28, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “COVID-19 is Finishing Off the Sino-American Relationship.” Project
Syndicate, April 29, 2020.
Pei, Minxin.” Cultural Decoupling from China Will Hurt the US.” Project
Syndicate, August 18, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “Delaying Xi’s Visit to Japan Offers Chance for Real Strategic Progress.” Nikkei Asia, March 24,
Pei, Minxin. “The Four Albatrosses Weighing Down Xi Jinping.” Nikkei Asia, October 7, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. "How Has the Coronavirus Crisis Affected Xi's Power: A Preliminary Assessment." China Leadership Monitor, June 1, 2020.
Abstract: The December 2019 coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan and the subsequent spread of the pandemic throughout the country and the world is the worst political crisis Chinese leader Xi Jinping has faced in his seven years
in power. The party-state's poor initial response, whether due to the cover-up by local officials or Xi's own inadequate attention or poor judgment, not only reveals some of the well-known systemic flaws in the Chinese state but also
exposes Xi to criticisms of questionable leadership. Yet, despite its initial missteps, the party-state managed to contain the viral outbreak quickly, largely due to its formidable capacity to mobilize the resources at its disposal. While
sustaining real, albeit limited, damage to his authority for now, Xi is likely to experience greater difficulties in confronting the medium-to-long-term economic and geopolitical consequences of the pandemic.
Pei, Minxin. “How the Hong Kong Calamity Will Play Out.” Project Syndicate, May 25, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “How the U.S. and China Can Learn to Live with Each Other.” Bloomberg Opinion, April
Pei, Minxin. “Japan’s Geopolitical Balancing Act Just Got Harder.” Project
Syndicate, September 17, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “Political Carnage of China’s Coronavirus Outbreak is Just Beginning.” Nikkei Asia, February 19, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “The Political Logic of China’s Strategic Mistakes.” Project
Syndicate, July 8, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “A Roadmap for Stabilizing Sino-American Relations.” Project
Syndicate, November 25, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “Trump’s Election Gift to China?” Project Syndicate, October 29, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “Trump’s Gift to China.” Project Syndicate, January 8, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “Why China’s Hard-Line Position on Human Rights is a Strategic Folly.” Nikkei Asia, November 30, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “Will the Coronavirus Topple China’s One-Party Regime?” Project Syndicate,
March 4, 2020.
Pei, Minxin. “Year of the Rat Starts with Shaky US-China Trade Deal.” Nikkei Asia, January 24, 2020.
External Grant: Pei, Minxin, Editor-in-Chief of the China Leadership Monitor, Smith Richardson Foundation, 2020, $281,166.
Abstract: This grant funds the publication of this online quarterly journal from Sept. 1, 2020 to Aug. 31, 2022.