Schroeder, S. Andrew. "Consequentializing and Its Consequences." Philosophical Studies, vol. 174, issue 6, 2017, pp. 1475-1497.
Abstract: Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that we can and should ''consequentialize'' non-consequentialist moral theories, putting them into a consequentialist framework. I argue that these philosophers, usually treated as a group, in fact offer three separate arguments, two of which are incompatible. I show that none represent significant threats to a committed non-consequentialist, and that the literature has suffered due to a failure to distinguish these arguments. I conclude by showing that the failure of the consequentializers' arguments has implications for disciplines, such as economics, logic, decision theory, and linguistics, which sometimes use a consequentialist structure to represent non-consequentialist ethical theories.
Schroeder, S. Andrew. "The Public vs. Private Value of Health, and Their Relationship.” Review of Valuing Health: Well-Being, Freedom, and Suffering, by Daniel Hausman, Journal of Economic Methodology, vol. 24, issue 3, 2017, pp. 349-355.
Schroeder, S. Andrew. "Using Democratic Values in Science: an Objection and (Partial) Response." Philosophy of Science, vol. 84, issue 5, 2017, pp. 1044-1054.
Abstract: Many philosophers of science have argued that social and ethical values have a significant role to play in core parts of the scientific process. This naturally suggests the following question: when such value choices need to be made, which or whose values should be used? A common answer to this question turns to democratic values--the values of the public or its representatives. I argue that this imposes a morally significant burden on certain scientists, effectively requiring them to advocate for policy positions they strongly disagree with. I conclude by discussing under what conditions this burden might be justified.
Schroeder, S. Andrew. "Value Choices in Summary Measures of Population Health." Public Health Ethics, vol. 10, issue 2, 2017, pp. 176-187.
Abstract: Summary measures of health, such as the QALY and DALY, have long been known to incorporate a number of value choices. In this paper, though, I show that the value choices in the construction of such measures extend far beyond what is generally recognized. In showing this, I hope both to improve the understanding of those measures by epidemiologists, health economists, and policy-makers, and also to contribute to the general debate about the extent to which such measures should be adjusted to reflect ethical values.
External Grant: Schroeder, S. Andrew. Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Faculty Fellowship at Princeton University Center for Human Values, 2017–18.
Residential fellowship including 50% salary support and research expenses, to support research on the ethics of science and on the philosophy of disability.