Kind, Amy. “Conference Report: Imagination and Social Change.” The Junkyard, October 9, 2019,
Kind, Amy. “Imagination Minimalized.” The British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 59, issue 2, 2019, pp. 215-218.
Abstract: In Only Imagine, Kathleen Stock defends a theory of fictional content she calls extreme intentionalism. Roughly put, this view holds that the fictional content of a text is determined solely by its author’s intention. What is true in a given work of fiction gets fixed by what the author of that fiction intends a reader to imagine. Given the prominent role that imagination plays in extreme intentionalism, it is no surprise that Stock’s exploration of the nature of intentional content would lead her to an exploration of the nature of imagination as well—or, at least, an exploration of the kind of imagination involved in engaging with fiction. Stock calls this kind of imagining ‘F-imagining’ and, over the course of the book, she offers an account of F-imagining that, while not wholly exhaustive, nonetheless succeeds in detailing many of its key features. Interestingly, several of the features Stock attributes to F-imagining puts her in conflict with many standard claims about imagination that one finds in the contemporary literature. Indeed, as quickly becomes clear, the account of imagination that she ends up with is a minimalistic one—in other words, it is an account that might be said to minimalize imagination. While there are some benefits to this approach, in this commentary I will explore some reasons to be wary of it.
Kind, Amy. “Mary’s Powers of Imagination.” The Knowledge Argument, edited by Sam Coleman. Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 161-179.
Abstract: One common response to the knowledge argument is the ability hypothesis. Proponents of the ability hypothesis accept that Mary learns what seeing red is like when she exits her black-and-white room, but they deny that the kind of knowledge she gains is propositional in nature. Rather, she acquires a cluster of abilities that she previously lacked, in particular, the abilities to recognize, remember, and imagine the color red. For proponents of the ability hypothesis, knowing what an experience is like simply consists in the possession of these abilities. Criticisms of the ability hypothesis tend to focus on this last claim. Such critics tend to accept that Mary gains these abilities when she leaves the room, but they deny that such abilities constitute knowledge of what an experience is like. To my mind, however, this critical strategy grants too much. Focusing specifically on imaginative ability, I argue that Mary does not gain this ability when she leaves the room for she already had the ability to imagine red while she was inside it. Moreover, despite what some have thought, the ability hypothesis cannot be easily rescued by recasting it in terms of a more restrictive imaginative ability. My purpose here is not to take sides in the debate about physicalism, i.e., my criticism of the ability hypothesis is not offered in an attempt to defend the anti- physicalist conclusion of the knowledge argument. Rather, my purpose is to redeem imagination from the misleading picture of it that discussion of the knowledge argument has fostered.
Kind, Amy. Review of Creativity and Philosophy, edited by Berys Gaut and Matthew Kieran. Philosophy in Review, vol. 39, no. 3, 2019, pp. 129-131.
Kind, Amy. Review of The Farewell, directed by Lulu Wang. The Philosopher’s Magazine, issue 87, 4th Quarter, 2019, pp. 111-112.
Kind, Amy. Review of Only Imagine: Fiction, Interpretation, and Imagination, by Kathleen Stock. Mind, vol. 128, issue 510, 2019, pp. 601-608.