Kind, Amy. “Empathy, Imagination, and the Law.” Virtue, Emotion and Imagination in Law and Legal
Reasoning, edited by Amalia Amaya and Maksymilian Del Mar. Bloomsbury, 2020, pp. 179-197.
Abstract: Two different pictures of a judge's role - the umpire model and the empathy model - have recently received considerable attention in both the popular press and the legal scholarship. While this attention has
helped us to begin to refine our sense of the two different pictures, we have not yet achieved an adequate understanding of either of these models or how they relate to one another. This chapter aims to achieve greater clarity by
consideration of six different lessons on these issues. I start with three lessons that are relatively straightforward and, in many ways, have already been fairly well learned. I then turn to three lessons that are less straightforward and,
it seems, have yet to receive adequate consideration. Ultimately, we will see not only that these two models are not as starkly opposed as might initially appear but also that we would do best to move past this debate altogether. Rather
than continuing to focus on empathy, we should instead look to imagination as a key virtue of judicial decision-making. As I will argue, a focus on imagination allows us to satisfy many of the motivations lying behind both the umpire model
and the empathy model.
Kind, Amy. "Imaginative Experience.” Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness,
edited by Uriah Kriegel. Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 124-141.
Abstract: Questions about the phenomenal character of our imaginative experience, about how it is and is not like the phenomenal character of perceptual experience, about how it is and is not like the phenomenal character
of other mental activities - have a long history in philosophical discussions of imagination. Philosophers have also long asked parallel questions about the nature of imagination. But in this essay, our focus will not be on what imagination
is but rather on what it is like. Rather than exploring the various accounts of imagination on offer in the philosophical literature, we will instead be exploring the various accounts of imaginative experience on offer in that literature.
In particular, our focus will be on three different sorts of accounts that have played an especially prominent role in philosophical thinking about these issues, what I call the impoverishment view, the will-dependence view, and the
nonexistence view. While I believe there are important insights to be drawn from each of these views, each seems to me to be importantly flawed in various ways. As I will suggest, close examination reveals that none of them gives us an
adequate account of the character of imaginative experience. Ultimately, in the final section of this paper, I briefly explore what their failure teaches us about the project of giving an account of imaginative experience.
Kind, Amy. "Philosophical Perspectives on Imagination in the Western Tradition.” The Cambridge Handbook of
Imagination, edited by Anna Abraham. Cambridge University Press, 2020, pp. 64-79.
Abstract: Philosophers in the Western tradition have both theorized about imagination and used imagination in their theorizing about other matters. In this chapter, I first provide a brief overview of philosophical
theorizing about imagination with a special focus on its relation to other mental states such as belief and perception. I then turn to a discussion of the methodological role that imagination has played in philosophy. I here focus on the
imaginability principle, i.e., the claim that the imaginability of a given scenario entails that such a scenario is in some sense possible. Relying on this kind of principle, philosophers have used imagination to justify theories in domains
such as philosophy of mind, metaphysics and ethics.
Kind, Amy. Philosophy of Mind: The Basics. Routledge Press, 2020.
Abstract: Philosophy of Mind: The Basics is a concise and engaging introduction to the fundamental philosophical questions and theories about the mind. The author Amy Kind, a leading expert in the field, examines central
issues concerning the nature of consciousness, thought, and emotion. The book addresses key questions such as: What is the nature of the mind? What is the relationship between the mind and the brain? Can machines have minds? How will future
technology impact the mind? With a glossary of key terms and suggestions for further reading, Philosophy of Mind: The Basics is an ideal starting point for anyone seeking a lively and accessible introduction to the rich and complex study of
philosophy of mind.
Kind, Amy. Review of Knowing Other Minds, edited by Anita Avramides and Matthew Parrott. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, September 8, 2020.
Kind, Amy. Review of The Life of Imagination, by Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei. British Journal of Aesthetics,
vol. 60, issue 2, 2020, pp. 234-237.
Kind, Amy. "The Skill of Imagination.” Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise, edited by
Ellen Fridland and Carlotta Pavese. Routledge, 2020, pp. 335-346.
Abstract: We often talk of people as being more or less imaginative than one another – as being better or worse at imagining - and we also compare various feats of imagination to one another in terms of how easy or hard
they are. Facts such as these might be taken to suggest that imagination is often implicitly understood as a skill. This implicit understanding, however, has rarely (if ever) been made explicit in the philosophical literature. Such is the
task of this chapter. I first attempt to flesh out several conditions for an activity to count as a skill. I then attempt to show how imagination can meet such conditions. The chapter concludes with an attempt to answer various worries that
might be raised to the claim that imagination should be thought of as a skill.
Kind, Amy. "Unlimited Imagination." The Philosopher's Magazine, issue 88, 2020, pp. 83-89.
Kind, Amy. "What Imagination Teaches.” Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change,
edited by Enoch Lambert and John Schwenkler. Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 133-146.
Abstract: In "What Experience Teaches," David Lewis famously argued that "having an experience is the best way or perhaps the only way, of coming to know what that experience is like"; when an experience is of a
sufficiently new sort, mere science lessons are not enough. Developing this Lewisian line, L.A. Paul has suggested that some experiences are epistemically transformative. Until an individual has such an experience it remains epistemically
inaccessible to her. No amount of book-learning, or testimony from others, will be enough to give her this access - nor will be she be able to achieve it by way of imaginative projection. It's this last claim that I will question in this
paper. Can imagination teach us about fundamentally new kinds of experiences, experiences that are radically unlike any of the experiences that we've had before? As I argue in this paper, this question should be answered in the affirmative.